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DO MICROCREDIT LOANS DO WHAT THEY ARE INTENDED TO DO? A
CASE STUDY OF THE CREDIT VILLAGE MICROCREDIT PROGRAM IN
CHINA

Abstract
The purpose of this study is to assess if the Credit Village is an effective way to develop a
microcredit program in China from the perspective of poverty reduction policy and
risk-monitoring. Cross-sectional household survey data from three credit villages in the
Yunan County of China are analyzed using 3SLS and IV probit models. The major finding
is that the Credit Village loosens credit restrictions to some extent. However, it has no
impact on educational expenditures, medical expenditures, long-term assets, short-term
assets and women’s rights. Our results are similar to the results found in Banerjee et al.
(2015a). It is our observation that the microcredit program in China needs more
innovation to become effective.
Keyword: Credit Village, Microcredit innovation, Welfare Impact
JEL Classifications: O22, Q14

1. Introduction
Microcredit is a financial intervention that provides loans without collateral to
underserved groups that are excluded by traditional financial institutions (Aggarwal et
al., 2015; Holvoet, 2005; Yunus, 2004). Microcredit uses special mechanisms, such as
group lending, progressive lending, regular repayment installments, making repayment
public, targeting women, financial collaterals, and dynamic incentives (Armendáriz and
Morduch, 2010). It provides non-financial services to farmers, such as health education,
cultural education, marketing eduction, and training in agriculture production practices.
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Implementation and operation mechanisms of microcredit have been developed in
different countries (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010; Awunyo-Vitor et al., 2012;
Garikipati, 2008; Goetz and Sen Gupta, 1994; Hermes et al., 2005; Holvoet, 2005;
Rahman, 1999), so microcredit systems vary in their operational details, but the
fundamental objective of providing loans to the poor without collateral stays the same.
The microcredit program in China was started in 1994 by the Rural
Development Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and the Yi county
government of Hebei province for the purpose of poverty alleviation. The microcredit
program is currently operated by three different entities: the government,
non-government organizations, and financial institutions. The government agencies that
operate the microcredit program are departments operating under the poverty alleviation
mandate, such as the Poverty Relief Office and the Labor and Social Security
Department. The non-governmental organizations, supported by government,
international donors and others, include the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and the
Women’s Federation, among others. Financial institutions providing microcredit include
rural credit cooperatives, village banks, and other microcredit companies. Microcredit
from rural credit cooperatives is the primary credit source in rural areas in China. These
rural credit cooperatives get capital through deposits, refinancing, and rediscount from
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the People's Bank of China; however, information asymmetry restricts the development
of microcredit for individual lending.
Credit Village is an innovation of the microcredit mechanism for clearing the
obstacles that exist between the rural credit cooperatives and farmers. It enables the
direct flow of capital from rural credit cooperatives to farmers. Another objective of the
Credit Village is to prevent an excessive flow of capital from rural to urban areas. The
Credit Village reduces credit risk through three mechanisms: by rating farmers; by
sharing information with other governmental departments such as the Public Security
Bureau and the Administration for Industry and Commerce; and by creating a donation
foundation pool which can be expanded five times by rural credit cooperatives to lend to
the poor for income generating activities. It extends the Grameen Bank model by
penalizing those who fail to repay with social and economic exclusions, not only to the
credit group, but also to the entire village.
We analyze the Credit Village mechanism based on microcredit theory and
evaluate its effectiveness using 3SLS and IV Probit models to data available from
Guangdong Province, China. We organize the remaining parts of the paper as follows.
First, we provide literature reviews related to the role of microcredit on asset buildup,
education expenditures, health expenditures, and women’s empowerment. Second, we
provide the working structure of the Credit Village program used in the paper. Third, we
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describe the models used in the paper. Finally, we provide results and conclude the paper
by highlighting the implications of this study to China’s rural credit market and the
applicability of the study to rural development in other developing countries.

2. Literature review
2.1 The impact of microcredit on the income and household assets of farmers
The growth of income and household assets are the most important financial outcomes of
microcredit because these are effective indicators for gauging poverty alleviation. Effects
of microcredit on these financial outcomes have been found to be both positive and
negative (Nader, 2008; Li et al., 2011; Swain and Varghese, 2009; Montgomery and
Weiss, 2011;, Awunyo-Vitor et al., 2012; Van Rooyen et al., 2012; Weber and Ahmad,
2014; Loubere and Shen, 2018; Loubere, 2018). Microcredit correlates with the income
and household assets of farmers positively, but the effect is very small (Nader, 2008). One
explanation given was that many microcredit programs focus on survival issues rather
than income generation (Nader, 2008; Awunyo-Vitor et al., 2012). Positive effects of
microcredit on income and wealth build up are observed only when participants go
through multiple loan cycles (Montgomery and Weiss, 2011; Weber and Ahmad, 2014)．
Swain and Varghese (2009) affirm the positive impacts of microcredit on
farmers' long-term assets only if the MFI requires members to save money and
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accumulate poultry and livestock before approving the loan. Hossain (2012) and Imai et
al. (2010) find significant poverty reducing effects of microcredit in rural areas in India
and Bangladesh. In China, participation in microcredit has improved income level when
the loan is used in income generating activities, and the program has been effective when
borrowers are more involved in the program(Shuai et al., 2011; Li et al., 2011; Hsu, 2017)
Several other studies have indicated that microcredit has negative effects on
asset buildup, especially among participants in Zimbabwe, Pakistan, and Sub-Saharan
African countries (Van Rooyen et al., 2012; Barnes et al., 2001; Goldberg, 2005). A
systematic review has been undertaken by Van Rooyen et al. (2012) in Sub-Saharan
Africa. The authors conclude that microcredit increases poverty in some cases, but
poverty can be overcome by better addressing farmers’ needs. Microcredit by commercial
financial institutions had no effect on farmers’ income and assets, irrespective of whether
they invested the money in agriculture or other microenterprise (Montgomery and Weiss,
2011). Combining the loan along with other nonfinancial services like training,
marketing, and education can help farmers to generate more income and build-up short
and long term assets.

2.2 The impact of microcredit on education in farm households
The schooling rate of children is one of the proxy variables of education. In analyzing the
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impact of microcredit on the schooling rate, researchers assume a positive education
demand elasticity of income. Microcredit may improve the schooling rate by increasing
income, smoothing shock, lending to women, and changing the awareness of parents
(Nader, 2008; Montgomery and Weiss, 2011, Maldonado and González-Vega, 2008).
Based on data from Egypt, Nader (2008) concludes that microcredit increases the
schooling rates of recipient's children. Montgomery and Weiss (2011) also confirm this
finding using data from Pakistan. They indicate that the families receiving microcredit
are able to send children to school, thereby reducing the total educational inequalities
within the community. Maldonado and González-Vega (2008) indicate that microcredit
can also reduce the school enrollment rate for children as there is also a demand for child
labor in agriculture and other microenterprises. This view is consistent with the findings
of Shimamura and Lastarria-Cornhiel (2010), who indicate that girls’ school attendance
rates declined because agricultural credit induced income generating activities in tobacco
production increased in rural Malawi. Hazarika and Sarangi (2008) conclude that
microcredit-induced enterprise may not reduce the schooling rate, but the children
attending the school from the household with a microcredit enterprise are tired because of
farm work and put less effort into their studies.

2.3 The impact of microcredit on women’s empowerment
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The relationship of microcredit and women’s empowerment lies in two aspects. First,
microcredit gives women an increased chance to take part in income generating activities,
even if they may not always succeed in generating a high return from the investment. It
gives them self-confidence and bargaining power in the family (Osmani, 2007). Second,
microcredit with group lending organizes women from different walks of life together that
can uplift their spirits and help them to face challenges along with other group members
(Osmani, 2007; Revindo and Gan, 2017). Microcredit from the Women’s Federation (WF)
is one path to success. The WF gives women borrowers yellow bean seeds and provides
new production technology along with needed microcredit. The WF is a national
non-government organization (NGO) that has a strong influence among women
borrowers in China. From the transaction cost perspective, providing microcredit along
with non-financial service increases the cost of microfinance institutions. So the best
strategy may be “borrower+organization+MFI,” with organizations giving non-financial
services to borrowers. This is a financial linkage system for decreasing transaction costs.
The indicators for women’s empowerment include financial and social aspects, such
as decision-making, resource-controlling, better treatment in the village, a sense of
self-confidence, family harmony, equitable status, participating in a social network
actively and access to loans (Rahman, 1986; Goetz and Sen Gupta, 1994; Khandker et al.,
1995; Nader, 2008;, Weber and Ahmad, 2014; Revindo and Gan, 2017). Since there are
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many indicators available, the results in previous studies do not seem to show across the
board positive effects.
Nader (2008) claims that if women do not put themselves in a decision making
position, participation in microcredit may not be able to empower them. The impact of
microcredit on family harmony can be positive since it increases income, but at the same
time may have a negative impact because there is less time available for leisure activities
(Nader, 2008). Additionally, women generally do not have full control of the loan
borrowed from the microfinance institutions. What is unfortunate in many cases is that if
a husband has a loan that he is unwilling to pay, his wife has to settle the debt by selling
whatever meager assets they may have accumulated. This problem can be overcome by
making loans to women and empowering them with market access (Goetz and Sen Gupta,
1994). Several authors (Rahman,1986; Khandker et al., 1995; Montgomery and Weiss,
2011) have expressed the view that irrespective of who has the managing power,
microcredit receiving households are much better off than non-recipient households when
evaluated using criteria such as income, consumption, and the right to make decisions by
females in a household.
Decision-making abilities are more important for women’s empowerment than other
rights. However, microcredit cannot be translated into household decision-making
automatically. Microcredit has a significant impact on decision making when it is given
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through women’s groups, especially if the women have been members of the group for a
long time (Holvoet, 2005). This is because group pressure and group financial support
improve a woman's position within the household. Therefore, delivery models and lending
technology are assumed to be more important than the credit itself in empowering women
through microcredit (Holvoet; 2005, Garikipati, 2008; Jia et al., 2016). Ganle et al. (2015)
explain that women’s empowerment depends on the capacity to control the loan and
having a microenterprise before receiving the loan. At the same time, they emphasize the
importance of adequate loan size, appropriate timing, effective monitoring, and better
screening methods in lending to ensure women’s empowerment.
Weber and Ahmad (2014) explain that microcredit has an impact on financial
empowerment (for example: asset buying, household expenses, and income spending) but
not on social empowerment (for example: decision-making, schooling, and marriage).
They add that social empowerment is not obtained through increasing income and asset
accumulation, but through external forces, such as the cooperation of the husband,
autonomous productive activities, family members, and peers outside of the household
(Weber and Ahmad, 2014; Ngo and Wahhaj, 2012).

2.4 The impact of microcredit on health expenditures
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Microcredit and the household's health are connected through four pathways: social,
economic, psychological, and political. Better healthcare is possible because microcredit
provides social support, increases income, provides a stronger voice in the community and
household, and boosts self-confidence (Mohindra and Haddad, 2005; Ahmed et al., 2001;
Mohindra and Haddad, 2005; Montgomery and Weiss, 2011; Pronyk et al., 2006). The
most important pathway is that microcredit gives fund to vulnerable groups without
collateral to respond to health shocks. In addition to that, the other contributions to
health include health awareness, prevention and guidance. This also provide
opportunities to spread health knowledge to group members. Microcredit has group
power and non-financial services that make it different from other types of credit.
Households receiving microcredit loans provide better medical care for their
children and have a lower rate of child mortality (Montgomery and Weiss, 2011) than
nonparticipating households. Ahmed et al. (2001) compare mental health problems in two
groups of rural women with the same social and economic status. Their study shows that
microfinance participants had better mental health as measured by emotional well-being
and stress levels. Where women's mental health problems are mostly because of economic
problems, the intervention of microcredit can provide loans, skills training, and savings,
which improves the economic status of poor women in their households. Women's mental
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health problems originating from economic problems are therefore resolved gradually as
they continue their membership in the group.
Mohindra and Haddad (2005) also find a significant positive relationship
between microcredit and women's health as measured by health care expenditures and
mental stress. Pronyk et al. (2006) find that South African women participating in the
microcredit project for two years experienced 55% less intimate partner violence
compared to the nonparticipating women. However, they did not find any difference in
the prevention of HIV between two groups. It is clear from these studies that microcredit
can improve the health of recipient households through its unique operating mechanisms.
Different proxy variables of farmers’ welfare have different results. Different
cultures needs different proxy variables to analyze the impact of microcredit. As for the
women’s power, women in China have more rights and wealth than in other South Asian
countries such as Bangladesh and India. Measures like seeing the doctor when ill or
having assets under the woman’s name are not good proxy variables for measuring the
results of obtaining microcredit in China.

2.5 Problems with microcredit
Microcredit is not the panacea, as described in the previous subsections (2.1-2.4).
Excluding problems related to data and econometric methods, there are several
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shortcomings of the microcredit program as pointed out by previous authors (Yunus,
2011; Duvendack and Palmer-Jones, 2012;, Banerjee, 2013; Duvendack et al., 2014;
Banerjee et al., 2015b; Angelucci et al., 2015; Loubere and Shen, 2018; Loubere, 2018).
The field work of Loubere (2018) in China indicates that microcredit has both
beneficial and detrimental impacts during the process of capital, knowledge, and
technology transfers from the central town to marginal villages. The negative impact
comes from the arbitrage of village officers and elites based on the non-standard
operation mechanism as compared to the Grameen Bank operation model. Coleman
(2006) also provides evidence through his study of a group-lending program of women in
Northeast Thailand that microcredit targets wealthier farmers and has a positive impact
on affluent and well-connected farmers. The MFI selects the lending group member based
on land holding and local information known through the village leader. This selection
process leads to a wealthy group member phenomenon that makes poor farmers think
only the wealthy can apply to become a group member and hence results in a
relationship-based lending (mission drift occurs). It worsens marginalization of the poor
in rural areas. In transforming developing countries, microcredit addresses social
problem only temporarily for the workers who are getting laid-off (Loubere, 2017).
Loubere and Shen (2018) provide evidence based on two microcredit programs: the
Employment Microcredit Program and the Farmer Microcredit Program in China. They
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indicates that microcredit causes marginalisation and demarginalisation at the same
time without a net positive impact. Microcredit benefits local elites based on relationships
(Loubere and Zhang, 2015).
Banerjee et al. (2015a) do not find a substantial impact of microcredit on income,
consumption, health, education and women’s empowerment in India. Angelucci et al.
(2015) measured the impact of microcredit in Mexico using 37 different outcomes
encompassing micro entrepreneurship, income, labor supply, expenditures, social status,
and subjective well-being, and find no impact.
One of the reasons why microcredit fails is because the time-inconsistent
borrowers increase consumption too much, and they have no ability to deposit funds for
repayment (Banerjee, 2013). If borrowers use microcredit for consumption, do not have
business acumen, and do not have an income-generating project, microcredit cannot
generate more income effects (Banerjee, 2013). Eventually microcredit decreases farmers’
borrowing ability and expenditure (Seng, 2018).
Other reasons are that investment in microenterprise needs a high return
exceeding 24% to cover the interest of microcredit, which is a difficult proposition for
small size farmers, the poor (Banerjee et al., 2015a), and especially women who face
family-related and individual-related challenges, due to funds, the project itself or other
difficulties (Brana, 2013). Gender discrimination leads to smaller loan size and higher
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interest rates for women than men (Brana, 2013). Women empowerment requires them to
be able to control the loan, the income-generating business, and overcome many social
and cultural constraints (Ganle, 2015), which they may feel are too challenging and
simply give up and decline to participate in the microcredit borrowing process.
Microcredit’s assumptions that borrowers have business acumen and income-generating
projects able to generate higher profits than farming are faulty. Interest rates are
inconsistent with the income generating potential of the project in many cases (Bateman,
2014). Yunus, the founder of microcredit himself, has described many problems
associated with microcredit in India where mission drift has happened as microcredit
institutions got hijacked by profit making entrepreneurs charging high interest rates
(Yunus, 2011). With commercialization of microcredit in some developing countries, MFI
accelerates to deviate from its social task. Bateman (2017) indicates that the
microfinance sector, especially for out of country investors, earns huge returns through
“accumulation by dispossession” from the poor, not through reconstruct value, and thus
causes a negative social impact.
Social capital is essential for living in a village. Defaulting borrowers lose social
capital, which makes it difficult for them to live in the same village after the default. Even
worse is the fact that indebtedness of a group member makes the leader of the group
suffer both emotionally and financially. This lack of social capital and social ostracizing
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after default makes microcredit borrowers worse off (De Quidt et al., 2018) than before
participating in the microcredit process. Women borrowers will encounter more violence
for non-repayment of microcredit. Given these problems, some developing countries have
halted microcredit projects. An easy and crude policy like halting microcredit projects
breaks credit equilibrium for the poor and make credit supply even worse (Breza et al.,
2018).
In conclusion, giving farmers loans to solve their loan restrictions is not the best way
to increase their income. The loan may get misused by someone other than the borrower
or the borrower may use the loan in a nonproductive area, which leads to heterogeneity
and non-linear development (Loubere, 2018). Standardizing microcredit systems and
combining the loan along with other nonfinancial services like training, marketing, and
education can help microcredit to overcome its shortcoming (Jia et al., 2016). External
microcredit intervention needs heterogeneous implementation at local and individual
levels to be effective (Loubere and Shen, 2018).
We introduce a new microcredit operating mechanism based on Yunus’ theory
that links social capital with lending to decrease default rates and increase default cost.
We are not only proposing to give loans to vulnerable groups, but also providing a series of
nonfinancial services, including help with starting a project, assistance with technology,
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selling products, and helping to pay the interest rate of microcredit. Additionally, we
select appropriate variables that are reflective and consistent with the culture of China.

3. Microcredit innovation mechanisms in Yunan county, Guangdong, China
Yunan county, located in the Guangdong province of China, is a typical mountainous and
agricultural area with 500,000 inhabitants. Of these people, 81% live in a rural setting
(Figure 1). The majority of farmers are involved in the production or processing of orange,
seedless wampee, and sericulture. When the Credit Village program started in 2009, the
per capita annual net income of farmers was RMB 5,894, which was much lower than the
RMB 6,907 per capita income of Guangdong residents. The number of people below the
poverty line in the agricultural sector was about 28,000, or 4497 households. Research
conducted by the People's Bank of China in 2009 showed that 80% of the farmers in
Yunan county think that it is difficult for them to obtain loans from formal financial
institutions. The loans owned by formal financial institutions in Yunan county increased
by only 22.41% from 2000 to 2008 and the loan-to-deposit ratio was 36.7% in 2008. The
slow growth of loan disbursement indicates that farmers are facing a bottleneck in
borrowing. In our sample, 44.1% of farmers think they could not borrow what they need,
and 10.56% of farmers believe they could borrow only a very small part of what they need
before the Credit Village program got started.
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For resolving credit restrictions and enhancing food consumption, farm input
applications, and health and educational attainments, the government of Yunan county
has been cooperating with microfinance institutions (MFIs) to implement Credit Village
since 2009. The goal of the program is three tier credit risk management: (1) rating of
farmers based on political, economic, and social information, (2) establishing an
information center for the farmers and for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) so that
MFIs could obtain information to lower transaction cost, and (3) alleviating poverty by
way of microfinance so that the path of disbursing loans to farmers and the poor is
redesigned.

3.1 Credit Village
Farmers cannot obtain loans from financial institutions without collateral. A Credit
Village can give loans without collateral; this is an innovation of the Yunan County
Credit Village (YCCV). The functioning of YCCV is based on the microcredit theory that
relies on social capital as collateral. The first step consists of rating individuals by a
rating body comprised of eighteen individuals representing government officials,
cooperatives, village leaders, Chinese Communist Party members, retired cadres, and
other respected members of the village (Figure 2). The ratings reflect the basic conditions
of the farmers, their credit, and other financial conditions. An application for rating is
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initiated by a household. After the application is received by the rating body, the
application gets evaluated and the household’s credit worthiness is classified into one of
the following categories: excellent (80-100), good (70-80), average (60-70), and poor (below
60). A household with an excellent or good rating is a credit worthy household, which
qualifies it to obtain a loan at a reasonable interest rate (Figure 3). This type of household
is considered a low risk or model household by the county government.
Rural Credit Cooperatives will commit a loan of up to 30,000 RMB to a
household with an excellent credit rating and 10,000 RMB to a household with good credit
rating. If three or more households with a good credit rating form a group, each one of
them can get a loan up to 20,000 RMB. A household with an average credit rating cannot
borrow independently but may qualify to borrow if it forms a group of at least three
members. In such cases, each household receives up to 10,000 RMB. This is done to
reduce the risk associated with lending to households with an average credit rating.
Of the 623 households in the Wutan village of Yunan county, 420 households
qualified after participating in the rating process. Among them, 41 households received
an excellent credit rating, 318 households received a good credit rating, 29 households
received an average credit rating, and 32 households received a poor credit rating. A total
of 85.5% households received an excellent or good credit rating. Wutan village was given
recognition as a Credit Village after a year of assessment.
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Credit Village recognition is important for the economic well-being of a village.
The conditions for becoming a credit village are: (1) non-delinquent loans should account
for at least 80% of the total loans disbursed to households, (2) the village must have 60%
of households with excellent or good credit ratings, and (3) the Village Party Branch and
People’s committee must actively support the work of financial institutions and assist
financial institutions to organize funds and recover defaulted loans. A credit village could
receive a greater loan size and 10% additional discount in the interest rate from financial
institutions. Unlike the microcredit setting in Grameen Bank, a household who defaults
on their credit can jeopardize the whole village’s credit village recognition.
The ratings grade can also be used to discover a model individual to be
recognized by the county government every year (while a defaulter will be punished not
only in the credit market, but also in social and political settings). The rating result is
dynamic, and it is applicable for only two years (the objective is to make loan repayment a
habit). Within two years of approval, households can use the authorized credit amount.
The interest rate is charged according to the actual amount of the loan and there are no
additional fees associated with it.
Through the Credit Village, the relationship between farmers and cooperatives
changes into a relationship among farmers, cooperatives, and government. Government
plays a coordinating role between the cooperatives and farmers by making the credit
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rating uniform. If an individual defaults, he gets penalized socially, politically, and
economically. On the other hand, if an individual repays, the Credit Village continues to
gain an advantage in loan size and loan rate (multiplier effects).

3.2 County credit information center
Although the Rural Credit Cooperatives in China have a goal to increase the volume of
loans disbursed, credit risks and high transaction costs are major obstacles to the
microcredit system. The county credit information center is a mechanism innovation that
provides credit worthiness information about farmers and SMEs to MFIs. Yunan county
is a pioneer in the sense that it created the first county-level credit center that collects
information regarding farmers and SMEs originally stored in the Public Security Bureau,
Administration for Industry and Commerce, Electric Power Company, Ministry of
Human Resources and Social Security, the bank and other departments. This information
includes wage arrears information from the Bureau of Human Resources and Social
Security, payment to the Telecom and Water Supply Corporation and Electric Power
Company, litigation in court, the failure to pay tax from the Local Taxation Bureau,
illegal environmental activities reported to the Bureau of Environmental Protection,
administrative penalties and awards, and certificates of qualification in relevant
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departments. We provide the functioning structure of the Yunan County Information
Center in Figure 4.
If MFIs previously needed information about clients, they had to expend lots of
resources and it was difficult to obtain information as they had to contact different
departments of government. Yunan County Credit Information Center is unique because
it provides both financial and nonfinancial information related to farmers and
nonfarmers that is not readily available to most financial institutions. This integration of
information reduces adverse selection and moral hazards while also leading to lower
transaction costs and interest rates.
The importance of the information center can be understood even better by
observing what happened in India. There, farmers borrowed money from one MFI to pay
to another MFI, creating a consumptive loan rather than the productive loan it was
intended to be. This has been highlighted by Armendáriz and Morduch (2010) and Dogra
(2016). 2 This type of incident can be avoided through the information center innovation
started by Yunan county.

3.3 Poverty alleviation in a financial way

2
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Innovation of the poverty alleviation mode is the third aspect of YCCV. The general
modus operandi of poverty alleviation in China has been to provide food, clothing, or
perhaps some monetary support to the rural poor. This approach is a temporary solution
to poverty. YCCV implements a financial way to reduce poverty that puts relief money in
a foundation as collateral (Figure 5). The Rural Credit Cooperatives disburses loans
totaling up to five times the deposited relief money in the foundation. The loan amount
provided by the Rural Credit Cooperatives to a borrower cannot exceed 20,000 RMB, the
interest amount has to be paid quarterly, and the principal has to be paid by maturity
(generally within three years). Another condition for the loan is that 90% of the interest
amount has to be paid by the government officials who are responsible for helping the
poor, and the remaining 10% interest amount is paid by the borrower. Each of the
borrower’s projects gets appraised by the relevant government departments for
feasibility, and the government departments offer technical support, provide agricultural
inputs in credit, and help borrowers sell output. By following these steps, relief money is
changed into a microcredit loan with non-financial services and a low interest rate.
There are at least three advantages of this innovation developed by YCCV:
1. From the perspective of non-financial services, Nader (2008) recommends
additional development activities (non-financial services) while providing loans to
enhance the ability of borrowers. Although Bhatt and Tang (2002) warn that
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non-financial services should not be a necessary condition for borrowing, the
non-financial services at Yunan involve feasibility analysis, technical support, and health
awareness services. Therefore, it should be more effective at improving the livelihood of
poor farmers.
2. From the point of view of the interest rate charged, the international
microcredit interest rate is between 20% and 50%, compared to only a 6% interest rate on
the microcredit provided to poor farmers in Yunan county (Even more interesting is the
fact that only 0.6% is paid by the poor borrowers). Based on Dehejia et al. (2012), poor
borrowers have more loan demand interest rate elasticity than the rich; therefore, a lower
interest rate will provide incentives to poor borrowers to get microcredit loans.
3. The involvement of NGOs or other organizations between the borrowers and
the financial institutions has been found to be effective in previous studies. Swain and
Varghese (2009) indicate a long term positive impact such as more asset creation if NGOs
act as intermediaries between banks and borrowers to provide non-financial services.
When the loan is transferred through women's organizations, the impact of microcredit
on empowerment of women is obvious, especially when women are in the organization for
a long time and they participate in more training and group meetings (Holvoet, 2005).

4. Method
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We can use a simultaneous equation method to test if the Credit Village loosens credit
restrictions and improves farmers’ living conditions through a change in asset buildup,
health, and education expenditures. The impact on women’s rights can be assessed using
a probit model with the dependent variable related to women’s decision making power
(yes/no) in the household.
Long term assets, short term assets, medical expenditures, and education
expenditures are interrelated to each other. Long term assets and short term assets have
an impact on medical and education expenditures because selling these assets provides
the cash needed for medical and educational expenditures. In the rural financial market,
credit restrictions make owned capital more important than other factors of production.
Short term assets are more liquid than long term assets. Medical expenditures can reduce
the funds available for educational expenditures. If there were a choice between
educational attainment and medical treatments, villagers were likely to select the
medical treatment first. Long term assets can also be impacted by short term assets
because short term assets are an important capital resource for purchasing long term
assets. These variables are endogenous to the system; therefore, corresponding
simultaneous equations can be expressed as follows:
𝑀𝑖 = 𝛾𝑀 + 𝛼𝑀 𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀 𝑆𝑖 + 𝜃𝑀 𝐹𝑖 + 𝛿𝑀 𝐿𝐴𝑖 + 𝜑𝑀 𝑆𝐴𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑀

𝐸𝑖 = 𝛾𝐸 + 𝛼𝐸 𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽𝐸 𝑆𝑖 + 𝜃𝐸 𝐹𝑖 + 𝛿𝐸 𝐿𝐴𝑖 + 𝜑𝐸 𝑆𝐴𝑖 + 𝜌𝐸 𝑀𝑖 +𝜖𝑖𝐸
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𝐿𝐴𝑖 = 𝛾𝐿𝐴 + 𝛼𝐿𝐴 𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽𝐿𝐴 𝑆𝑖 + 𝜃𝐿𝐴 𝐹𝑖 + 𝜇𝐿𝐴 𝐺𝑖 + 𝜑𝐿𝐴 𝑆𝐴𝑖 + 𝜌𝐿𝐴 𝑀𝑖 + 𝜎𝐿𝐴 𝐸𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝐿𝐴
𝑆𝐴𝑖 = 𝛾𝑆𝐴 + 𝛼𝑆𝐴 𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽𝑆𝐴 𝑆𝑖 + 𝜃𝑆𝐴 𝐹𝑖 + 𝜏𝑆𝐴 𝐻𝑖 + 𝜌𝑆𝐴 𝑀𝑖 + 𝜎𝑆𝐴 𝐸𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑆𝐴

Here, M is medical expenditures, E is education expenditures, LA is a long term asset and
SA is a short term asset. The coefficient of 𝐹𝑖 measures the impact of a participant’s credit

rating, loan from MFI and informal ways on household welfare. 𝐷𝑖 is a matrix

representing the farmers’ demographics, including gender, job, education, household
head, land and labor ratio. 𝑆𝑖 is the proxy variable of the farmers’ social situation. 𝐺𝑖 is the

proxy variable of factors that impact long term assets, but do not impact short term assets
(Household income in 2010). 𝐻𝑖 is the proxy variable of factors that impact short term

assets, but do not impact long term assets (household members who are involved in
farming); 𝜖𝑖 is error with 𝐸�𝜖𝑖 �𝑋� = 0 and 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟�𝜖𝑖 , 𝜖𝑖𝑘 �𝑋� ≠ 0, where 𝑋 is all
𝑗

𝑗

𝑗

exogenous independent variables.

Given that we have some dependent variables enter into another equation as
explanatory variables and error terms are correlated across equations, we estimate the
above model using a three stage least square (3SLS) method. The 3SLS can use the
variance-covariance matrix of cross-equation error terms to correctly estimate the
standard error of all equation parameters (Zellner and Theil, 1962; Faggian and McCann,
2009). The Hausman specification test results show that a better specified order of models
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is: iterative 3SLS, 3SLS, 2SLS, OLS, so we choose to interpret parameter estimates from
the iterative 3SLS in the results section.
The identification issue needs to be resolved when estimating a 3SLS model.
Test statistics presented in Tables 1a and 1b indicate that there are no issues related to
under identification in the model.
Self-selection issues are often encountered in loan disbursement, as Rural Credit
Cooperatives sometimes give loans only to well-to-do clients. Those who receive loans
may differ from the very beginning from those who do not receive loans and they continue
to differ in resource endowment over time. MFIs choose poor areas where it is easier to
implement microcredit. Therefore, unmeasured area factors and household attributes
could be obstacles to calculating the real impact of microcredit.
Under the Credit Village system, MFIs give loans to farmers without collateral
except in cases of households with poor ratings. Households with poor ratings only
account for 7.7% in our sample. Some of these farmers can obtain loans under the system
of financial poverty alleviation. We select three villages in the sample with similar
political, economic, and social conditions. Furthermore by setting the credit rating level
and village as independent variables, we can avoid the selection bias issue.
To determine the variables affecting women’s rights, we use the following
specification:
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𝑊𝑖 = 𝛾𝑊 + 𝛼𝑊 𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽𝑊 𝑆𝑖 + 𝜃𝑊 𝐹𝑖 + 𝜎𝑊 𝑅𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑊

Except 𝑅𝑖 , all the variables used in this equation are defined previously. 𝑅𝑖 is a

matrix that includes farmers’ social relationship variables, such as the number of

siblings and the surviving parents of both spouses. This equation is estimated using an
IV probit model. Variable Household income in 2011 is endogenous and we use the village
as an instrument variable. Different villages have different geographic orientations and
soil fertility levels that can be important factors affecting income generation, but that is
only a cause, not a result, and therefore has no relationship to the error term or the
women’s rights variable. These geographical and soil related variables impact women’s
rights only through income.

5. Data and Variables
We interviewed randomly selected households from three villages (Dadi, Gumian,
Wutan) in Yunan county, Guangdong province in 2012. These three villages have similar
political, economic, and social conditions. The Credit Village has been implemented in
Yunan county since 2009. We interviewed a total of 214 households: 48 households from
Dadi village, 31 households from Gumian village, and 135 households from Wutan
village. Most of the farmers are from Wutan village because the Credit Village program
was first implemented there.
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We use demographic, social, economic, and financial variables in regression
models. Dependent variables include education expenditures, medical expenditures, long
term assets, short term assets, and women’s rights (Table 2). Education and medical
expenditures reflect the amount of household spending on education and health in 2011.
Compulsory education and some form of minimal medical insurance have been
implemented in the study area for many years prior to the Credit Village program.
However, education and medical expenditures are still a significant component of
spending by farmers. Family members in households go to university or pursue other
educational training. There is also the likelihood that some family members will incur
health problems that will increase loan demand because rural income is seasonal, but
medical and educational expenditures occur throughout the year. Our hypothesis is that
the Credit Village provides liquidity and loosens cash restrictions, thereby allowing
farmers an opportunity to spend on education and medical expenses when needed.
We sum the value of family house and farm machinery, electrical appliances,
and furniture in 2011 to derive the total long term assets. The value of household
livestock in 2011 represents the short term assets. Short term asset investment and
parts of long term asset investment (except for farm machinery) are termed productive
investment in accordance with the loan rules of MFI. Therefore, our hypothesis is
that Credit Village has a positive impact on short term and long term asset buildup.
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The value of the women’s rights variable is equal to one when women can
decide how to spend money in households. Compared with other variables
like decision-making, resource-controlling, better treatment in district, a sense of
self-confidence, family harmony, and access to loans, this variable can express women’s
rights more accurately. In China, rural women have less rights than urban women
because urban women can earn income from outside work. If the Credit Village can give
loans to rural women, they can earn more and gain more rights. So we hypothesize that
the Credit Village has a positive impact on women’s rights.
Independent variables include demographics, social relationships, and the
economic and financial characteristics of a household. Demographic variables include
gender, age, education, job, labor ratio, village, the number of family members involved
in farming, student number in the household, and land size. A farmer’s financial
situation is indicated by participating in the credit rating program, borrowing from a
microfinance institution (MFI), and borrowing from friends and relatives. The number of
parents, siblings, and the spouse represent the social relationships of households.
Independent economic variables are income in 2011 and in 2010, along with the health
situation of household members.
Definitions of variables used and their descriptive statistics are shown in Table
2. As shown in the table, 83.18% of household heads are male and 16.82% are female,

30

This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.

45.79% of household heads are above 50 years of age, the education level of household
heads is concentrated at the junior high school level (with 39.91% of the sample
belonging to this category) and there are 27.71% household heads with only a primary
school education, and 4.72% household heads with a university level education. The main
occupation of household heads is farming, accounting for 82.24% of all surveyed
households, and small business and migrant work are stated as occupations by 4.12% of
the household heads. The three villages selected in the study are primarily dominated by
farming operations, so the lion share of income for the households in these villages comes
from farming. The education level and the jobs chosen by households are related, as low
education precludes many household heads from getting high-paying jobs, so they are
engaged in a low income generating job like farming. Similarly, old age may restrict one
to migrant work or owning a small business.
In our sample, 74.15% of women can decide how to use money, whereas 63.90%
of women can decide on all family related issues. The social status and freedom
experienced by Chinese women is better than that of women in other developing
countries.
Only 29.65% of households in the sample participated in the credit rating
program. Because of a lower participation in the program, there are still 39.72%
households who cannot borrow from MFIs. Of those who borrowed money, 24.39% of
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households borrowed only from microcredit institutions, whereas 75.61% borrowed from
friends and relatives to meet their family's financial needs in 2009-2011. There are
41.71% households who incurred medical expenditures.
On average each household has about six family members, of which three are
laborers and two are engaged in farming. The average landholding size is 8.72 Mu, 3
including woodlands and arable lands. The average number of family members at school
equals around one person. The number of siblings of household heads and spouse is
averaged to four. The number of parents belonging to the head of the household or the
spouse is one. Siblings and parents represent social relationships that provide informal
financial resources, but elderly parents may become a financial burden to households.

6. Results
6.1 Impact on education
Results from the iterative 3SLS model (Table 3) show that household expenditures in
education go down if medical expenditures increase. Results indicate that these two
expenditure categories are substitutes. For every one percent increase in medical
expenditures, there is a 2.60 percent reduction in education expenditures. Land holding
has quadratic effects on education expenditures. As land holding increases, education
3

15 mu = 1 hectare
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expenditures also increase, but education expenditures decrease after the land holding
size reaches to 23.3 mu (approximately 1.56 hectares). This is because land has dual
characteristics. Land as capital provides returns annually that can support expenses
needed for education. In a rural setting, more land also requires more laborers for the
production process. This labor requirement for production forces household members to
work in the field instead of going to school, thereby reducing education expenditures.
Others have found similar results in the labor allocation tradeoff between education and
farm work in developing countries (Maldonado and Gonzalez-Vega, 2008).
Households in the Dadi village spend about 3.24% less on education than the
households from the other two villages. Dadi village did not receive the title of Credit
Village by the time of this data collection. Marginal effects of some of these significant
variables at 1st quartile, median, and 3rd quartile values are shown in Figure 6 (land) and
Figure 7 (medical expenditures). Credit rating and loan from MFIs have no impact on
educational expenditure.

6.2 Impact on medical expenditures
Results show that land has quadratic effects on household medical expenditures (Table
3). As land holding increases, medical expenditures also increase, but medical
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expenditures decrease after the land holding size reaches to 16.25 mu. We do not find
long term and short term assets impacting the amount spent on medical treatment.
In China, medical insurance was implemented when the Credit Village program
started, but the coverage is for basic checkups and low priced medicine. Oftentimes the
coverage amount is low and households have to pay in full after the maximum allowable
funds from the insurance are exhausted. In such cases farmers borrow from friends and
relatives, as financial institutions cannot give loans to farmers for medical treatment
unless something is used as collateral or there is a guarantor. A farmer with more land
can buy commercial insurance, which means he or she does not need to spend out of
pocket money for medical expenditures once the premium is paid (the premium for basic
coverage for one person per year is about RMB150, whereas it is approximately RMB 500
per person per year for the commercial coverage 4). In our sample, 82.2% households are
farmers; therefore, more land holdings mean they can buy commercial insurance, thereby
avoiding their responsibilities for medical expenses in case of a catastrophic health event.
We also find that a household with no major health problems spends less on medical
expenditures.
4

The Chinese government implements the basic health insurance program for farmers, the

premium of which is set at about RMB 150 per year. Commercial insurance should be purchased
from commercial companies so the premium amount is different. The value shown here is
averaged across several providers based on the authors’ knowledge of the area and information
available from insurance agents in the region.
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Marginal effects show that a one mu increase in land holding increases 347.52 RMB
in medical expenditures. Marginal effects of land holding at 1st quartile, median, and 3rd
quartile values are shown in Figure 8. Credit rating and loan from MFIs have no impact
on medical expenditure.

6.3 Impact on long term assets and short term assets
We use the sum of economic value of the family house, farm machinery, electrical
appliances, and furniture to define long term assets. Among these, the value of the house
and farm machinery contributes the most towards long term assets. The long term assets
increase if farmers acquire these items. Yunan county farmers have mainly fruit orchards
and livestock, where manual labor is the norm during the production and harvesting
process. Machinery use is minimum.
Results in Table 3 show that household heads of 31-40 years of age invest less in
long term assets compared to other households. We can see from Figures 9, 10, 11, and 12
that household heads of 31-40 years of age had the lowest income. Figures also show that
a farming head of household invests less on long term assets than others in both 2010 and
2011. This group of farmers does not invest in long term assets compared to the household
heads of other ages and professions. They are in the stage of life between being students
and older parents. Daily expenses and a low salary make them unable to accumulate long
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term assets. The mountainous landscape of Yunan county is also a reason for not
investing in long term assets as a farmer.
Results in Table 3 show that more farming members in the household lead to more
short term asset investment. We use the value of household livestock in 2011. This result
give us information about the importance of livestock in the rural households in the
sample districts.

6.4 Impact on women’s rights
We use a female in the household having the ability to make decisions as a proxy to
measure women’s rights. The results (Table 4) show that if the household head’s parents
are both alive it has a negative impact on women’s rights. If a household head is older
than 50 years, the woman’s rights are less compared to other age groups.
Land, as a proxy variable of assets, has a negative effects on women’s rights. Women
in households with more land holding have less rights, which is because of the unique
land system in China. In China, the government implements land laws to protect the
rights of women. Land owned by married women gets expropriated by the village
collective of their former domiciles, requiring the village collective of their husbands to
give them land. However, if both parents of the woman in question are still alive, the
village collective does not expropriate the land, and the new residence village collective
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does not redistribute lands to these married women. This creates a situation in which
married women can be landless. If a household owns more land this only give husbands
more rights, not wives. In our study, 82% of household heads are farmers, and farming is
the way of life. Land means economic rights in the family, and those who own more land
also have more economic rights.
If a household head is above 50 years of age, he is likely to be more conservative
and more likely to make decisions regarding all family issues. A younger household head
is likely to be more educated and consider his wife an equal partner. Women’s rights are
therefore related to the household head’s age, and this is confirmed by our results. It is
traditional in China and many other Asian countries that the parents of the household
head live with their son. The wife of the household head must obey what her husband’s
parents say. Otherwise, she is considered unfit to be a daughter-in-law by other villagers
and cannot continue to live in the village. Therefore, living parents of the household head
have a negative impact on women’s rights.
Financial situations such as the participation in credit rating, borrowing from financial
institutions, and borrowing from relatives and friends have no effect on women’s rights.
Credit Village has no mechanism to focus on women’s rights.

7. Conclusions
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Results indicated that Credit Village has no impact on long term assets, short term
assets, education expenditures, medical expenditures, and women’s rights. However, the
Credit Village loosens credit restrictions to some extent as can be seen from Figures 6 and
7. We found that although only 30% of farmers took part in the credit rating, credit
disbursement has changed substantially in Yunan county. Before the implementation of
the YCCV credit rating program, 45.83% were able to obtain loans, but this jumped to
65.79% after the credit rating (Figures 13 and 14).
On the basis of these observations, one may wonder why the Credit Village
program did not improve some of the indicators we have measured in this study. We think
time and involvement are the two main reasons. Our survey was conducted only two
years after the implementation of YCCV. YCCV may not have impacted economic
activities within that short time period. To make the Credit Village program more
effective, all agents and entities, including the farmer, MFI, and government, need to
work in unison.
Credit village is dominated by the county government and its feasibility is
determined by the system set-up and follow-up with different organizations and the
successful implementation of the credit rating system. Only county government can make
the different departments share information and provide confidence to loan applicants
about the system. Dependence on the government to implement and induce market
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behavior can result in a lack of long term sustainability, full of hysteresis and variability.
Potential replications of the Credit Village program by other countries may be feasible by
overcoming some of the drawbacks identified in this paper.
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Table 1a. Instrumental variable identification

VARIABLES

Weak identification test Over identification
Kleibergen-Paap Wald Hansen J stat
F-stat

Under identification test
Kleibergen-Paap LM stat

Medical
expenditure

2.721

8.818
(0.18）

12.091
(0.09)

Education
expenditure

2.424

5.549
(0.47)

13.412
(0.06)

Note: P-value of Chi-square in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Weak
identification test depend that 2.721 is less than 20% maximal IV size value 10.41 and
20% maximal IV relative bias value 6.20.

Table 1b.
(1)
Medical
expenditure
F value

4.12
(0.000)

F-statistic of the first stage
(2)
Education
expenditure

(3)
Long-term
asset

(4)
Short-term
asset

2.94
(0.000)

1.93
(0.022 )

1.66
(0.060)

Note: Prob > F in parentheses
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Table 2. Variable Definitions
Variable

Definition

Average

Dependent variables
Amount of household
Education
education expenditure
expenditure
in 2011
Amount of household
Medical
medical expenditure
expenditure
in 2011
The sum value of
family house and farm
Long-term
machinery, electrical
asset
appliances and
furniture in 2011
The value of
Short-term
household livestock in
asset
2011
Women can decide
Women right
how to spend money of
household
Explanatory variables
Gender = 1 if the
Gender
household head is
male, else is 0
Family members had
Sickness
major disease in 2011
Number of students in
Students
the household
Family participates in
Credit rating
credit rating
Mus of household
Land
woodland and
farmland
Household obtained
Loan from MFI loan from MFI only in
2009-2011

Std. Dev.

5240.67

10501.54

5890.19

12158.63

122645.10

201591.20

3898.99

17285.76

0.74

0.44

0.832

0.375

0.583

0.494

1

1.180

0.300

0.460

8.721

12.020

0.218

0.415
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Household obtained
loan from relatives
and friends only in
2009-2011
Number of working
Labor ratio
members/family
members
The household lives in
Wutan village
Wutan village
The household lives in
Dadi village
Dadi village
The age of household
Age31-40
head is 31-40
The age of household
Above 50
head is above 50
The education level of
High school
household head is
university
The education level of
University
household head is
university
The job of household
Farmer
head is farmer
The job of household
Village cadre
head is village cadre
The amount of
Farming
farming member in
your family
Household income in
Income2011
2011
Household income in
Income2010
2010
Alive siblings of Living siblings of
head
household head
Alive siblings of Living siblings of
spouse
spouse
Loan from
relatives and
friends

0.647

0.480

0.612

0.238

0.630

0.484

0.224

0.418

0.145

0.353

0.458

0.500

0.1830

0.388

0.047

0.212

0.822

0.383

0.047

0.212

2

1.513

38075.74

58992.54

40370.34

64729.17

3.588

2.129

3.875

1.975
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Alive parents of
head
Alive parents of
spouse

Living parents of
household head
Living parents of
spouse

0.842

0.840

0.962

0.850
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Table 3. The impact of Credit Village on education expenditure, medical expenditure,
long-term asset, and short-term asset in Yunan county, Guangdong province, China
obtained using an iterative 3SLS model.
Variable

Short-term
asset
Education
expenditure

Medical
expenditure
Gender
Age31-40

Education
expenditure

Medical
expenditure

Long-term
asset

-0.379

-0.031

0.141

(0.322)

(0.083)

(0.125)
-0.00434
(0.163)

-2.601***

0.746

(0.646)
1.348
(1.857)

0.314
(0.484)

-0.289
(1.737)
-0.00485***
(0.00162)

-0.404
(0.452)
-0.002***
(0.000)

(0.964)
-0.725
(0.675)
-1.495**
(0.603)
0.0797
(0.475)
0.383
(1.550)
-2.104
(1.475)
-1.944
(1.373)
-2.596
(1.887)
0.116
(0.0776)
-0.707
(0.707)
0.00121
(0.00174)

Above 50
High school
University
Farmer
Village cadre
Income2010
Credit rating
Land square

Short-term asset
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-0.286
(0.379)
-1.019
(2.331)
1.376
(1.583)
1.706
(1.357)
0.279
(1.042)
2.988
(3.753)
2.254
(3.249)
0.788
(3.153)
3.395
(4.158)
3.395
(4.158)

1.970
(1.634)
-0.00290
(0.00411)

Land
Loan from
MFI
Loan from
relatives and
friends
Labor ratio
farming
Wutan
village
Dadi village
Sickness
Students
Long-term
asset
Constant
N

0.226*
(0.119)
2.674

0.065**
(0.030)
-0.151

-0.0177
(0.0799)
0.153

0.158
(0.187)
1.521

(2.370)
2.989

(0.621)
0.380

(0.936)
-1.460

(2.348)
2.445
(2.249)

(2.381)
-3.474

(0.619)
-0.346

(0.958)
1.233

(3.271)
-0.919

(0.872)
-0.437

(1.291)

0.235
(3.147)
0.822**
(0.352)

(1.476)
-3.238*
(1.938)

0.793
(0.614)
-0.0640

(0.428)
-0.658
(0.547)
-0.707***
(0.216)
-0.041
(0.167)
0.057

(0.701)
27.60***
(9.522)
107

(0.192)
8.156***
(2.402)
107

5.898
(9.606)
107
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4.065
(23.32)
107

Table 4. Impact of the Credit Village on women's right in Yunan county, Guangdong
province, China as obtained from estimating a probit model.
Coefficient
(Robust standard error)

Variable
Sex

-0.047
(0.448)
-0.072
(0.398)
-1.262***
(0.481)
-0.182
(0.727)
-0.112**
(0.053)
0.002
(0.002)
0.151
(0.403)
0.408
(0.514)
0.628
(0.441)
-0.231
(1.045)
0.037
(0.196)
0.123
(0.080)
-0.611**
(0.300)
0.158
(0.132)
-0.040
(0.266)

Age31-40
Above 50
Farmer
Land
Land square
Credit village
Loan from MFI
Loan from relatives and friends
Labor ratio
Students
Living siblings of head
Living parents of head
Living siblings of spouse
Living parents of spouse
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Income2011

0.329
(0.354)
-2.072
(4.180)

Constant

N

105

Note: Values in the parentheses are standard errors.
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China

Guangdong province
Yunan county
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Household submits documents for
credit rating
Collecting
information,
personal
identity
verification

Village committee evaluates that the
household is not creditworthy or has
dishonest record

Credit investigation shows bad
record or identity verification
does not pass

Investigation
There are unpaid loan
and dishonest record

Initial evaluation

Credit rating score is
below 60
Re-evaluation

Hold a council meeting to
determine credit level (excellent,
good, average, poor)

Other major drawbacks that
proves the household
credit unworthy

poor

Declare credit rating result
Figure 2. Procedure for rating household’s credit worthiness in Yunan County, China
(Source: Modified and translated from the Yunan county government document)
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Household has an excellent or a
good-credit rating (Creditworthy
Household)
Written application to a rural credit cooperative
Asset and project investigation by
the cooperative
Setting of the
fixed interest
rate

Examine and
approve the
application

Sign contract

Completed within one to
two working days

Issue credit certificate

Complete application to
withdraw all or a fraction of
the specified loan amount

Receipt

Loan disbursement

This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.

Finished within one
working day

County government

Organize and lead
Query
information

County
Information
Center

Technical
support

The People's Bank of
China

Business guide

Information sharing
departments like
court

Submit
information

Submit
information

Query
information

Credit Village
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Financial institutions

Poor household applies for loan voluntarily
by completing a form required by Rural Credit Cooperatives

Village committee examines and
approves the completed form

Town government rural work office
evaluates the application initially

Town Rural Credit Cooperatives to survey,
inspect, and approve the application

Town Rural Credit Cooperatives send a qualified
application to County Rural Credit Cooperatives

Aid-the-poor Development Office of County
Government and Aid-the-poor group (manage the
foundation) together provide guarantee for the poor

Loan disbursement
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